1. South China Morning Post 2011-08-17
"A construction catastrophe waiting to happen"
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Warning signs of impending danger at the To Kwa Wan tenement went ignored. But what does the tragedy say about Hong Kong's 4,000 other 50-year-old buildings? When a five-storey tenement building collapsed in To Kwa Wan in January last year, those who saw it fall could not believe their eyes.
Warnings about the integrity of the structure had been issued minutes earlier, but the curious public crowded around anyway, unconcerned for their safety. After all, how could a tenement just fall?
In seconds, their faith in the integrity of Hong Kong's buildings was shaken as the structure was reduced to a pile of rubble and dust.
The ones towards the rear - two of which were supported by steel bars that had been bent into a V-shape - were especially vulnerable, said Wan Chi-wai, the surveyor who inspected the building two months before the collapse.
In Hong Kong and across the world, it is quite common for a multi-storey concrete building to have a design life of 50 years, said Law Chi-kwong, an assistant professor at The University of Hong Kong, who studies urban renewal.
But the crucial factors are maintenance and renovation. He said: "With better maintenance, they can last a bit longer, and with poor maintenance, they would not be able to last for 50 years."
Maintenance at the To Kwa Wan building was not carried out.
And there were warning signs - pieces of concrete that had fallen from the building's back wall were collected by a contractor, Chu Wai-wing, from a nearby alley months before the collapse.
Chu claimed he and his wife collected up to 500 kilograms of concrete debris by hand before the building's owner commissioned him to carry out repairs. But on the afternoon of Friday, January 29, four days after the contractor had started repair work, steel bars bearing the weight of a structural column at the rear of the building could take no more.
Hours after one of Chu's workers cut off iron bars supporting an illegal structure, the three columns gave way all together and the building crumbled, killing four people.
In the wake of the tragedy, the government sent building inspectors to the 4,000 or so other buildings in Hong Kong that were more than 50 years old.
Within weeks they issued 680 repair orders. And in June last year an amendment to the Buildings Ordinance was passed requiring every building more than 30 years old to be inspected every 10 years and repaired if necessary.
This week, the Buildings Department tried to have Chu, the contractor, prosecuted for unlawful killings due to a work-related error.
After six days of hearings, Coroner Michael Chan Pik-kiu declared yesterday that no one was to blame.
His decision that the deaths were accidental hinged on a crucial factor - whether the collapse could be blamed on human error.
He found they could not. But, as became clear at the hearings, the blunders that preceded the building's collapse were many.
At the inquest, the contractor said he told the building's owner, Chak Oi-luen, many times of the dangers of her building, but she ignored him.
Chak, sole owner of the building through a company called Halesweet Ltd, said she made hundreds of calls to the Buildings Department in the two months before the collapse, only to be referred elsewhere.
But the Buildings Department said Chak reported no problems with her building's safety in an account she gave to police in December 2009, after taking over a ground-floor shop from its previous tenant.
It also said she failed to respond to two orders it had sent her, in November 2005 and June 2009, to remove illegal structures.
The Buildings Department, which sent inspection officers to 45 Ma Tau Wai Road in November 2009, did not issue a closure order.
The surveyor at the time, Wan Chi-wai, said closure was not necessary because he saw no immediate danger. When a repair order was issued by a different surveyor, it was not delivered until 16 days before the To Kwa Wan tenement collapsed. By then, it was too late.
The previous year, Kowloon City District Council, which could have applied for repair funds, and the Urban Renewal Authority - which had money available for the refurbishment of old buildings - passed over the To Kwa Wan building in favour of others. Everyone thought there was more time.
But how can the difference between probable and immediate danger be spotted? The coroner's verdict recognised the collapse was not the fault of any one entity and called on the government to assess potentially dangerous buildings more carefully.
But is there any way this one building could have stood out from the many other old buildings in Hong Kong in need of repair? Dealing with such issues is the job of risk analysts such as Vincent Ho, chairman of the Hong Kong Association of Risk Management and Safety.
But asked if possible building collapses could be avoided, he said: "If the government can inspect more, go more into detail, spend money to send structural engineers everywhere, if people have more awareness, if and if and if ... then maybe."
He said a sound building needed structural integrity from the beginning, but also a good construction company that followed design codes, developers who followed the rules, government inspection, then constant maintenance and more frequent safety inspections.
But sometimes, the real danger is discovered only when it is too late.
It is possible that even despite frequent inspections, any of the 4,000 other 50-year-old buildings in Hong Kong could become a hazard.
"There are multiple safety barriers," Ho said. "Each safety barrier has a weak point. But at a particular point and particular chance, you may be able to fail all safety barriers."
He explains this by referring to the "Swiss cheese" model, created by James Reason at the University of Manchester in England. If you have many slices of Swiss cheese (each representing a layer of the system), all filled with uniquely placed holes (representing opportunities for things to go wrong), and you line up all the slices, you may not be able to see through the multiple layers.
But at any one point, all the holes may line up, and then you are exposed.
This is what happened at To Kwa Wan - the holes in an entire system that went wrong eventually lined up.
A building collapsed, four died, and Hong Kong's construction industry was shaken to its foundations.
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2. 太陽報 2011-08-17
〈小氣候：文物保育專員輪住逃亡 〉
去年初馬頭圍道整幢唐樓倒塌慘劇，死因裁判官陳碧橋昨日裁定四名死者死於意外，事件中無人犯下須負上嚴重過失的刑責。相對於部分死者家屬在前一日的結案陳辭，矛頭指向屋宇署、大業主和二房東，這樣的裁決結果，難免讓家屬失望。
不過，陳碧橋在裁決中仍忍不住批評當日巡查唐樓的屋宇署測量師，以「流水作業」方式驗樓，工作態度求其、交行貨。此等用詞，打擊屋宇署的專業形象，作為監管屋宇安全的主責官員、發展局局長林鄭，難免感覺無面。以林鄭一貫嚴苛作風，處理犯錯官員絕不手軟，一旦發功，看來屋宇署內一眾經手塌樓事故的官員有難了。
林鄭一向對下屬工作要求甚高，無論本是同根生的政務官，抑或部門的專業官員，只要林鄭認為能力欠佳、表現不合心水，輕則隨時被調走，一旦累到林鄭鑊，更會被降職。像數年前署任水務署署長多年的陳志超，因為更換全港老化水管計劃進度落後，結果官復副署長原職，更變相降級調到土木工程署的新界拓展處，直到數月前才再度升任渠務署署長。
林鄭為官作風強悍，從來對手下官員無面畀，官場早已流傳不少政務官視調到發展局為畏途，是對個人仕途的能力挑戰。據說林鄭也向公務員事務局局長D姐明言，調到發展局的政務官必須做得，唔得唔要。林鄭「好打得」，但做她的手下卻好難熬。前任發展局常秘（規劃及地政）楊立門，年前突然平調往民政事務局，據說求去原因正是與林鄭意見不合，最後要由D姐介入，先把楊立門調返公務員事務局一段時間，再平調至民政局，平息這場火星撞地球風波。
楊立門在民政局坐定之後，年前適逢籌辦申亞，馬上向昔日發展局的舊同僚招手，撬走屬首長第二級（D2）、做了首任文物保育專員不足兩年的陳積志出任申亞專責小組副組長，雖然申亞好夢本年初被財委會拒絕撥款壽終，但陳積志隨即獲調升為D3的民政事務總署副署長，跟林鄭說再見。
發展局文物保育專員遺缺由另一名D2政務官蔡亮接任，不過大半年光景，蔡亮又於月前外調為香港駐東京經濟貿易代表，發展局這個文物保育專員職位再度懸空，可能D姐尚未物色到另一名「做得」的D2級政務官吧，職位至今仍然懸空，暫由文物保育專員辦事處總助理秘書長（工務）李鉅標署任。
蔡亮在上月中調走，林鄭剛好安排訪問法國三個城市，考察市區更新、文物保育與都市規劃和發展等項目。如果文物保育專員同行實地體驗，借鑑外國經驗推動本港文物保育工作，自然事半功倍，但專員職位虛懸，只能留待新官上任，再由親自考察歸來的林鄭耳提面命吧。
發展局三年前開設文物保育專員職位，林鄭聲言要快速回應社會對文物保育的訴求，但三年換了兩個專員，第三個未到任，莫非林鄭要求特別高，叫專員太沉重，於是快速閃？
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